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THE NECESSITY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN A
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN CALIFORNIA:
ELLIOTT v. ELLIOTT
The constructive trust1 has been called "the most important
contribution of equity to the remedies for the prevention of unjust
enrichment."2 California courts and the Restatement of Restitution3
have referred to the constructive trust as a proprietary remedial
device 4 to be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, capable of use
in almost any case where there is a wrongful acquisition or retention
of property.6 Dean Pound speaks of the use of the constructive
trust as affording "specific restitution of a received benefit in order
to prevent unjust enrichment.
'7
The constructive trust has been used to "frustrate human skull-
duggery,"8 yet it has remained an elusive remedy. One commenta-
1 See generally 3 G. BOGART, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (2d ed. 1960);
R. NEWMAN, TRUSTS 200 (2d ed. 1955); 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JuRIPDmEc
§ 156 (5th ed. 1941); 4A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462 (2d ed. 1956); Cobb, Resulting
and Constructive Trusts in Realty, 1 BAYLOR'L. RE. 296 (1949); Costigan, The
Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and Constructive, 27 HARv. L.
REv. 437 (1914); Gilmer, Current Developments in Resulting Trusts and Con-
structive Trusts in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 455 (1954); Jennings & Shapiro, The
Minnesota Law of Constructive Trusts and Analogous Equitable Remedies,
25 M NN. L. REV. 667 (1941); Scott, The Expectant Legatee, 63 HARv. L. REV.
108 (1949); Scott, Constructive Trusts, 71 L.Q. REV. 39 (1955); Waters, The
English Constructive Trust, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1019 (1967); Note, Imposition of
a Constructive Trust in New England, 41 B.U.L. REV. 78 (1961).
2 J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 26 (1951). "A constructive trust is
the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression." Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919).
8 RESTATEMENT Or RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
4 Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423 (1940); Schaefer v.
Bernstein, 180 Cal. App. 2d 107, 4 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1960); Reay v. Reay, 97 Cal.
App. 264, 275 P. 533 (1929).
5 Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 380 P.2d 385, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1963);
Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal. 2d 693, 242 P.2d 5 (1952); Beck v. West Coast Life
Ins. Co., 28 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952); Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal. 2d 131, 163
P.2d 443 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 843 (1946); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249
Cal. App. 2d 187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967); McCauley v. Dennis, 220 Cal. App.
2d 627, 34 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1963); Nevarez v. Nevarez, 202 Cal. App. 2d 596, 21
Cal. Rptr. 70 (1962); Ornbaun v. Main, 198 Cal. App. 2d 92, 17 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1961); Fleischman v. Blechman, 148 Cal. App. 2d 88, 306 P.2d 548 (1957);
Atwood v. Elwood, 132 Cal. App. 2d 761, 283 P.2d 43 (1955); Monica v. Pelicas,
131 Cal. App. 2d 700, 281 P.2d 269 (1955); Weightmon v. Hadley, 113 Cal. App.
2d 598, 248 P.2d 801 (1952) ; Adams v. Talbott, 61 Cal. App. 2d 315, 142 P.2d 775
(1943); Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. App.. 2d 116, 140 P.2d 31 (1943);
Sampson v. Bruder, 47 Cal. App. 2d 431, 118 P.2d 28 (1941).
0 Rankin v. Satir, 75 Cal. App. 2d 691, 171 P.2d 78 (1946); Sanguinetti
v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 P. 560 (1906).
7 Pound, The Progress of Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 421 (1920).
8 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY fI 593 (1949).
9 "Without much conscious purpose or plan we have created this sham-
bling creature. It is time to fence it in." J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 33. "It
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tor has observed that the vagueness surrounding this subject is de-
liberately intended, "so the powers of the equity courts will not be
unduly restricted."' 0
It has been suggested that the requirement of unjust enrich-
ment has engendered "a fight between those who want to expand the
common law by reference to its ultimate ethico-juridical principles
and those content to stay in clearly defined paths ... ."I' A victory
for those favoring expansion has seemingly occurred in the recent
California case of Elliott v. Elliott,12 where the district court of ap-
peal stated that a benefit to the wrongdoer is not required for the
imposition of a constructive trust.13 After examining the California
law relating to constructive trusts, this note will discuss the propriety
of that conclusion.
Constructive Trusts Prior to 1872
Prior to 1872, cases involving constructive trusts required: (1)
either a fiduciary relationship or wrongful or mistaken conduct; (2) a
proprietary interest gained; and (3) an inequitable retention and en-
joyment of the proprietary interest.
During this period constructive trusts were imposed where there
was a breach of a fiduciary duty by an attorney,' 4 guardian,' 5 co-
tenant,16 administrator,17 agent,18 and a bank officer. 9  Where an
agent acquired an interest in property adverse to his principal it was
held that the agent took as a constructive trustee;20 his partner,
who was outside the agency, took free of the constructive trust.
2 '
Similarly, constructive trusts were imposed where there was wrong-
ful conduct: for example, where the defendant misrepresented own-
ership of a mortgage in order to obtain title to real property,22 and
where a party seeking to acquire a patent to realty misrepresented
certain material facts.23 Constructive trusts, likewise, were used to
afford relief where an interest in property was gained by mistake, as
illustrated by one case where a widow mistakenly kept land from her
husband's heirs.
24
It was never enough merely to show that there was fraud, mis-
take, or a breach of a fiduciary relationship: there must have also
thus constitutes a fenceless field with hazy boundaries." 4 R. Pow..L, supra
note 8, at 565.
10 J. DAwsoN, supra note 2, at 148.
11 O'Connell, Unjust Enrichment, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 2 (1956).
12 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1964).
18 Id. at 210, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
14 Webster v. King, 33 Cal. 348 (1867).
'i Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17 (1866).
16 Mandeville v. Solomon, 33 Cal. 38 (1867).
1,7 Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410 (1871).
18 Hardenbergh v. Bacon, 33 Cal. 356 (1867).
'9 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133 (1859).
20 Hardenbergh v. Bacon, 33 Cal. 356 (1867).
21 Id. at 379.
22 De Leon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 (1860).
28 Salmon v. Symonds, 30 Cal. 301 (1866).
24 Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420 (1866).
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been some interest acquired thereby. California courts refused to
impose a constructive trust where either void25 or defective 6 title
to land was obtained by fraud. Where the interest obtained was
uncertain 27 or there had been a change in form,28 a constructive
trust would be imposed only if the identity of the interest could be
traced. Where it could not be shown that the property was the origi-
nal trust property or the fruit or product thereof, a constructive
trust would be denied.
29
There are several reasons for requiring the acquisition of a
proprietary interest. First, although a constructive trust is an equita-
ble remedy, it is dealt with in express trust terms and there must
therefore be a res. 30  Second, since a constructive trust is a specific
remedy, there must be some interest that can be returned to the
owner.31 Third, a constructive trust is a remedy for the prevention of
unjust enrichment 32 and the requirement of a proprietary interest
seems inextricably interwoven with that concept. So, where the
decisions require the defendant to have gained a proprietary inter-
est, it is difficult to determine if the court was simply requiring
that there be a res before there could be a trust, or whether the
court was requiring that there be some tangible unjust enrichment
gained or held by the defendant.
In discussing constructive trusts prior to 1872 the courts made no
specific references to the principle of unjust enrichment. Instead,
the courts required the retention and enjoyment of the interest to
be inequitable:
33
Where the circumstances of a transaction are such that a person who
takes title to property cannot be permitted to hold and enjoy it, in
whole or in part, without necessarily violating some principle of
equity, a constructive trust will be raised for the benefit of the party
entitled in equity to its beneficial enjoyment. It is because he holds
the property, or some interest therein, which is inequitable for him
to enjoy, that the court declares the trust and fastens it upon his
conscience, and wrests the property or interest from him and causes
it to be transferred to the person equitably entitled to it.34
The prevention of inequitable retention of property was seen as the
basis of the constructive trust and in this regard may be equated
with the principle of unjust enrichment.
25 Mandeville v. Solomon, 33 Cal. 38 (1867).
26 Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410 (1871).
27 Webster v. King, 33 Cal. 348 (1867).
28 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133 (1859).
29 Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17 (1866).
30 "It is necessary in establishing and enforcing such a trust that there
must be trust property as there should be trustee and cestui que trust ...
Mandeville v. Salmon, 33 Cal. 38, 44 (1867).
31 "The plaintiff must allege that the defendant holds the title or some
interest in certain property which is inequitable for him to enjoy as against the
plaintiff for this is the subject matter of the action, and in its absence there
is nothing the court can order transferred to him." Id.
32 See cases cited note 5 supra.
33 Meader v. Norton, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 443 (1870); Hardy v. Harkin, 11
F. Cas. 510 (No. 6060) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1865); Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420
(1866); Kruetz v. Livingston, 15 Cal. 344 (1860).
34 Mandeville v. Solomon, 33 Cal. 38, 44 (1867).
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It will be shown that the three requirements for imposition of a
constructive trust, discussed above, were codified in sections 2223
and 2224 of the California Civil Code in 1872.
Civil Code Seciions 2223 and 2224
California Civil Code section 2223 provides:
One who wrongfully detains a thing is an involuntary trustee thereof,
for the benefit of the owner.
California Civil Code section 2224 provides:
One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence,
the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some
other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing
gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.
Section 2223 applies only in the case of wrongful conduct; section
2224 applies in the case of specific kinds of wrongful conduct, in-
cluding fraud, undue influence and violation of a trust, and also
mistaken or accidental conduct. It is readily apparent that on this
point sections 2223 and 2224 are a codification of the first require-
ment found in the early cases.3 5
Both sections require that there be a proprietary interest gained,
thereby codifying the second requirement of the early cases.36 This
consequence results from the reference in both sections to "a thing."
It is clear that the statutory reference is to a res. The statutes do
differ in that section 2223 requires a detention, whereas section 2224
requires an acquisition. However, use of the word "detains" in sec-
tion 2223 does not mean that no proprietary interest need be gained;
it merely sets out the manner by which the wrongdoer might come
into possession of the interest. This section applies where the posses-
sion of the interest was lawfully attained but relinquishment is
wrongfully refused. Section 2224, referring to "gain," applies where
possession was wrongful from the beginning.
The pre-statutory requirement of inequitable retention,37 now
unjust enrichment, has also been codified by sections 2223 and 2224.
Section 2224 impliedly requires that there be unjust enrichment.
The key phrase is "unless he has some other and better right thereto."
This phrase requires the equities to be balanced and is essentially a
definition of unjust enrichment.38 Section 2223, requiring that there
be wrongful detention of property, does not expressly include the
concept of unjust enrichment. This statute, however, must be read
together with California Civil Code section 3517, which states, that
"[n] o one can take advantage of his own wrong." The latter section
35 See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra. Although called "involun-
tary" trusts by the legislature, trusts arising within sections 2223 and 2224 are
called "constructive" trusts by the courts. Strausburg v. Conner, 96 Cal. App.
2d 398, 215 P.2d 509 (1950). Both terms are acceptable because each imports
that such a trust is created by operation of law, rather than through the intent
of the parties as is the case in an express trust. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2217. But
see Touli v. Santa Cruz County Title Co., 20 Cal. App. 2d 495, 67 P.2d 404
(1937).
36 See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra.
37 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
38 R. NEwmAx, TRusTs 205 (2d ed. 1955).
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has been held to be a codification of the principle of unjust enrich-
ment.3 9 The California Supreme Court has stated that "[t] he general
principle that precludes a wrongdoer from unjustly enriching himself
has been codified in section 2224 and 3517 in the Civil Code.
'40 If
sections 2223 and 3517 are read together, it would appear that both
sections 2223 and 2224 are codifications of the prior case law and that
both sections may be reasonably construed to be directed at the pre-
vention of unjust enrichment.
Cases Under Civil Code Sections 2223 and 2224
California courts have used unjust enrichment as the basis for
imposing a constructive trust in three categories of cases: (1) where
there has been fraud, undue influence, mistake, or crime; (2) where
there has been a breach of a fiduciary duty; and (3) where there has
been a violation of an unenforceable contract.
In cases involving fraud,41 courts seem to focus on this element
to the exclusion of any discussion of the element of unjust enrich-
ment. Looking no further than to the- fraudulent misrepresentation
or concealment, the courts imply that fraud is the basis of the con-
39 Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952);
Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 185 P. 174 (1919).
40 Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 645, 241 P.2d 544, 545
(1952).
41 Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 364 P.2d 263, 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1961)
(husband fraudulently used community property to purchase property in de-
fendant's name and then divorced his wife); Simonton v. Trusts & Sav. Bank,
192 Cal. 651, 221 P. 368 (1923) (executrix fraudulently concealed part of
estate); Burns v. Ross, 190 Cal. 269, 212 P. 17 (1923) (defendant forged as-
signment of a contract for purchase of land); Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 185
P. 174 (1919) (misrepresented to testator the destruction of will under which
defendant would take); Crosby v. Clark, 132 Cal. 1, 63 P. 1022 (1901) (mis-
represented that prior possessor had left the land in obtaining title to land
from railroad); Greiner v. Greiner, 58 Cal. 115 (1881) (fraudulently concealed
property from wife on filing of divorce action); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (corporation fraudulently acquired prop-
erty); Fowler v. Fowler, 227 Cal. App. 2d 741, 39 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1964) (de-
fendant had his bride repair home on a promise that he would have ownership
of the home changed to a joint tenancy); Estrada v. Garcia, 132 Cal. App. 2d
545, 282 P.2d 547 (1955) (fraudulently represented ownership of house); Wal-
ter H. Leimert Co. v. Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186, 270 P.2d 95 (1954) (real
estate agent misrepresented that he would obtain land for principal and in-
stead purchased land for himself); Cardozo v. Bank of Am., 116 Cal. App.
2d 833, 254 P.2d 949 (1953) (fraudulently kept formal notice of probate from
remainderman); Sellman v. Sellman, 82 Cal. App. 2d 192, 185 P.2d 846 (1947)
(defendant misrepresented that he would pay note and instead purchased
property at execution sale); Kallmeyer v. Poore, 52 Cal. App. 2d 142, 125 P.2d
924 (1942) (fraudulent promise to buy plaintiff's land at foreclosure sale);
Apablasa v. Sepulveda, 91 Cal. App. 232, 267 P. 105 (1928) (wife misrepre-
sented she was only beneficiary under will); Cole v. Manning, 79 Cal. App. 55,
248 P. 1065 (1926) (married woman took property on representation that she
was single and would marry the plaintiff); Carter v. Holt, 28 Cal. App. 796,
154 P. 37 (1915) (fraudulently obtained money); Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal.
App. 479, 84 P. 326 (1905) (misrepresented value of land to be purchased when
obtaining money for that purpose from his wife).
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structive trust.42 But to limit the explanation of constructive trusts
to mere "fraud rectifying trusts"4 is inadequate for several reasons.
In the first place that rationale has forced the courts to establish a doc-
trine of constructive fraud, which is differentiated from actual fraud
by the courts, but is left undefined and limitless to serve as a catch-
all for what seems to be improper conduct.4 4 Second, in cases
where fraud is found, the courts nevertheless deny the imposition of
a constructive trust unless it is shown that there has been a benefit
to the wrongdoer. 5 For example, in a case involving misrepresenta-
tion of the cost of home repair by a building contractor, the court
denied a constructive trust, there having been no unjust enrichment
as a result of the misrepresentation.40 Third, any purported limita-
tion of constructive trusts to fraud cases is rebutted by the large
number of cases allowing a constructive trust where there has been
only a mistake47 or a breach of a fiduciary duty.48  Nor is the im-
position of a constructive trust based on fraud in cases where prop-
erty has been acquired through undue influence 49 or a criminal act.50
42 Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal. 2d 529, 61 P.2d 767 (1936); Hayne v. Herman,
97 Cal. 259, 32 P. 171 (1893); Pacific Nat'1 Bank v. Corona Nat'l Bank, 113
Cal. App. 366, 298 P. 144 (1931); Reay v. Reay, 97 Cal. App. 264, 275 P. 533
(1929); Holstrom v. Mullen, 84 Cal. App. 1, 257 P. 545 (1927); Sanguinetti v.
Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 P. 560 (1906).
43 Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal. 2d 529, 533, 61 P.2d 767, 769 (1936).
44 Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal. 2d 529, 61 P.2d 767 (1936); Jones v. Jones,
140 Cal. 587, 74 P. 143 (1903); Hayne v. Herman, 97 Cal. 259, 32 P. 171 (1893);
Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d 185, 57 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1967).
45 Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 742, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (1959) (so held
as to the escrow agent); Loomis v. Loomis, 148 Cal. 149, 82 P. 679 (1905).
40 McCauley v. Dennis, 220 Cal. App. 2d 627, 34 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1963).
47 Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal. 2d 252, 373
P.2d 637, 23 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1962) (retailer mistakenly charged customers too
much state sales tax); Donovan v. Stevens, 179 Cal. 32, 175 P. 400 (1918)
(attorney mistakenly collected too much for his fee); Estate of Walker, 160
Cal. 547, 117 P. 510 (1911) (later discovered will); First Nat'l Bank v. Wake-
field, 148 Cal. 558, 83 P. 1076 (1906) (mistakenly deposited money in bank);
Heydenfeldt v. Jacobs, 107 Cal. 373, 40 P. 492 (1895) (mistake in distribution
of estate); Brown v. Volz, 90 Cal. App. 2d 793, 204 P.2d 110 (1949) (mistakenly
designated accomodation maker on note as joint owner of the property).
48 Cases cited note 51 infra.
49 Allen v. Meyers, 5 Cal. 2d 311, 54 P.2d 450 (1936) (semiconscious
mother deeded property to defendant); Donnelly v. Rees, 141 Cal. 56, 74 P. 433
(1903) (secured conveyance from alcoholic); More v. More, 133 Cal. 489, 65
P. 1044 (1901) (secured conveyance from alcoholic); Clark v. Pullins, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 703, 341 P.2d 73 (1959) (decedent unduly influenced to devise property
to defendant); West v. Stainback, 108 Cal. App. 2d 806, 240 P.2d 366 (1952)
(niece improperly had all property of aunt willed to herself); Sampson v.
Bruder, 47 Cal. App. 2d 431, 118 P.2d 28 (1941) (defendant practiced duress
on elderly crippled woman to obtain property); Reay v. Reay, 97 Cal. App.
264, 275 P. 533 (1929) (son unduly influenced elderly mother to transfer
property to him).
50 Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952)
(beneficiary of insurance policy murdered insured); Whitfield v. Flaherty,
228 Cal. App. 2d 753, 39 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1964) (husband murdered wife);
Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler, 111 Cal. App. 2d 861, 245 P.2d 608 (1952)
(embezzled company funds); Church v. Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501, 203 P.2d
547 (1949) (misappropriated employer's funds); Brodie v. Barnes, 56 Cal. App.
2d 315, 132 P.2d 595 (1942) (embezzled funds).
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Clearly, the prevention of fraud does not explain the results in these
various cases, but the thread running through each is the court's
determination to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment by his
acquisition or retention of a res.
Constructive trusts have been imposed where property is ob-
tained through the violation of some fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship.51 Illustrative of the principle of unjust enrichment is a
case where a vice president of a bank fraudulently obtained money
for the benefit of the bank without its knowledge, and the bank
was held as a constructive trustee because it would not be allowed to
benefit from the fraud.52 One situation especially points up the neces-
sity for unjust enrichment: that is where a fiduciary acquires prop-
erty for himself, when this should have been done for the benefit
of his principal.53 And a party who receives trust property with no-
tice of the trust will take subject to a constructive trust.5 4  In all
of these situations the primary concern of the court is that the
fiduciary should not be allowed to benefit by his wrong. Such a
concern is simply a restatement of the principle of unjust enrichment.
Constructive trusts have also been used in certain unenforceable
contract cases. A constructive trust will not be imposed because of a
51 Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423 (1940) (director of
corporation acquired corporation property); Boldemann Chocolate Co. v. Price,
5 Cal. 2d 200, 53 P.2d 946 (1936) (president of corporation assigned away
insurance policy taken out on him by corporation); Leala v. Carral, 207 Cal.
542, 279 P. 443 (1929) (breach of agreement not to take as heir); Clark v.
Milisap, 197 Cal. 765, 242 P. 918 (1926) (attorney refused to account for
property turned over to him by client); MacDermott v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 170
P. 616 (1917) (stockbroker used principal's money to buy stock for himself);
Smith v. H.J. Goethe Co., 147 Cal. 725, 82 P. 384 (1905) (administrator had
mortgage foreclosed on estate); Becker v. Schwerdtle, 141 Cal. 386, 74 P. 1029
(1903) (son refused to keep bargain by which he was to support his mother
in exchange for property); Alaniz v. Casenave, 91 Cal. 41, 27 P. 521 (1891)
(daughter transferred property to father to manage); Brison v. Brison, 75
Cal. 525, 17 P. 689 (1888) (husband transferred property to wife before going
on trip); Briggs v. Nilson, 226 Cal. App. 2d 342, 38 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1964) (mother
repudiated promise to reconvey to daughter); South v. Wishard, 146 Cal. App.
2d 276, 303 P.2d 805 (1956) (attorney agreed to help with partner's client
and kept oil royalties from client); Carberry v. Trentham, 143 Cal. App. 83, 299
P.2d 966 (1956) (defendant neglected his duty to pay taxes on another's
property and bought property at tax sale); Air Purification, Inc. v. Carle,
99 Cal. App. 2d 258, 221 P.2d 700 (1950) (party to joint venture gets patent
on modification of company's model); Edwards v. Edwards, 90 Cal. App. 2d 33,
202 P.2d 589 (1949) (son promised to provide house for parents if they would
board him); Dalakis v. Paras, 86 Cal. App. 2d 243, 194 P.2d 736 (1948) (prop-
erty transferred to defendant's husband to hold); Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 194 P.2d 533 (1948) (defendant used power of attorney for his
own benefit); Adams v. Talbott, 61 Cal. App. 2d 315, 142 P.2d 775 (1943)
(property conveyed to the defendant to manage); Truesdail v. Lewis, 45 Cal.
App. 2d 718, 115 P.2d 218 (1941) (in return for his services, plaintiff was
promised part of the stock in newly formed corporation).
52 Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Corona Nat'l Bank, 113 Cal. App. 366, 298 P. 144
(1938).
53 Cases cited note 56 infra.
54 Scott v. Symonds, 191 Cal. 441, 216 P. 604 (1923); Lucas v. Associacao




bare promise to buy property for another,55 but will be imposed if an
agent or other fiduciary agrees to buy property for his principal,56
seemingly because only in the latter case will any retained benefit
be deemed unjustly retained. A constructive trust will be imposed
where there is an unenforceable promise to reconvey to the trans-
feror,57 or where there is a gift by will 55 or inter vivos conveyance59
on an oral promise to hold in trust for some third party. In these
cases, although there is usually a corresponding loss to the plaintiff,
there is always an unjustly retained benefit
The courts in their discussions spend a negligible amount of
time in considering the loss to the plaintiff and instead appear to be
concerned only with the proprietary interest retained by the defend-
55 Mazzera v. Wolf, 30 Cal. 2d 531, 183 P.2d 649 (1947); Taylor v. Kelly,
103 Cal. 178, 37 P. 216 (1894); Elliott v. Wood, 95 Cal. App. 2d 314, 212 P.2d 906
(1949).
56 Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal. 2d 808, 141 P.2d 732 (1943) (agent took
contract in his name for principal and later repudiated his fiduciary duty);
Webb v. Vercoe, 201 Cal. 754, 258 P. 1099 (1927) (agent who purchased prop-
erty for principal at foreclosure sale refused to reconvey); Koyer V. Willmon,
150 Cal. 785, 90 P. 135 (1907) (partner took property intended for partnership
in his own name); Broder v. Conklin, 77 Cal. 330, 19 P. 513 (1888) (attorney
repudiated trust after receiving deed from sale); Sadugor v. Holstein, 199
Cal. App. 2d 477, 18 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1962) (partner purchased land intended
for partnership for himself); South v. Wishard, 146 Cal. App. 2d 276, 303 P.2d
805 (1956) (attorney retained property intended for client); Walter H. Leimert
Co. v. Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186, 270 P.2d 95 (1954) (real estate agent
purchased land intended for principal).
57 Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal. 2d 529, 61 P.2d 767 (1936) (plaintiff trans-
ferred store to her sister); Smith v. Lombard, 201 Cal. 518, 258 P. 55 (1927)
(transfer of property in joint tenancy on oral promise that plaintiffs to have
possession for life); Becker v. Schwerdtle, 141 Cal. 386, 74 P. 1029 (1903)
(property conveyed to son on his promise to support mother); Jones v. Jones,
140 Cal. 587, 74 P. 143 (1903) (property conveyed to husband to oust tenant);
Alaniz v. Casenave, 91 Cal. 41, 27 P. 521 (1891) (property conveyed to father
to manage); Briggs v. Nilson, 226 Cal. App. 2d 342, 38 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1964)
(daughter executed joint tenancy to mother on promise to reconvey); Nev-
arez v. Nevarez, 202 Cal. App. 2d 596, 21 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1962) (property trans-
ferred to son before undergoing surgery); Atwood v. Elwood, 132 Cal. App.
2d 761, 283 P.2d 43 (1955) (property deeded to defendant to obtain patent to
land); McMillen v. McDonald, 127 Cal. App. 2d 302, 273 P.2d 683 (1954)
(property conveyed to defendants to obtain veterans tax benefit); Dalakis
v. Paras, 86 Cal. App. 2d 243, 194 P.2d 736 (1948) (money given to defendant's
husband to hold); Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 140 P.2d
31 (1943) (nephew deeded land to uncle who orally promised to reconvey).
58 Estate of Sargavak, 41 Cal. 2d 314, 259 P.2d 897 (1953); Leala v.
Carroll, 207 Cal. 542, 279 P. 443 (1929).
59 Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 380 P.2d 385, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1963)
(wife agreed to convey to children); Aho v. Kusnert, 12 Cal. 2d 687, 87 P.2d
358 (1939) (husband promised to convey to children); Allen v. Meyers, 5 Cal.
2d 311, 54 P.2d 450 (1936) (promised to reconvey to plaintiffs); Lauricella v.
Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 P. 430 (1911) (promised to devise to grantor's
parents); Kimball v. Tripp, 136 Cal. 361, 69 P. 428 (1902) (promise to hold in
trust for plaintiffs); Hayne v. Hermann, 97 Cal. 259, 32 P. 171 (1893) (promised
to hold in trust for children); Casey v. Casey, 97 Cal. App. 2d 875, 218 P.2d
842 (1950) (promised to hold in trust for plaintiff).
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ant.60 Although the courts do not in every instance express the need
for unjust enrichment as a condition precedent to the imposition of a
constructive trust, the facts and results invariably justify such a
conclusion,6 1 and certainly no case specifically rejects unjust enrich-
ment as a standard. This fact explains why, in the cases involving
fraud, a constructive trust is not imposed unless it is shown that
some benefit has been gained by that fraud. In the cases where a
fiduciary has breached his duty, he is forced to turn over to his
principal his ill-gotten gains even though it is not shown that the
principal is entitled to the profits or that the principal has suffered
any loss. 6 2 In the cases involving the violation of an unenforceable
contract, property has been passed to the defendant to hold, and he
refuses to relinquish the property.
Applicable California statutes and case law require unjust en-
richment before a constructive trust will be imposed. This accumu-
lation of authority has been challenged by the court in Elliott v.
Elliott. 63
Elliott v. Elliott
In Elliott v. Elliott, the plaintiff brought an action against her
former husband to have him declared a constructive trustee of one-
half of the face value of a promissory note plus interest. This one-
half interest had been awarded to the wife as community property in
an interlocutory decree of divorce. The statute of limitations ran on
the note while the divorce decree was on appeal and after the wife
had demanded that the husband collect on the note. The defendant
contended that a constructive trust could be imposed under California
Civil Code sections 2223 and 2224 only if the plaintiff proved that the
defendant had gained a benefit and that since the note was worthless
there was no benefit. The court, relying on the Restatement of Res-
titution and three California cases, stated, "we do not deem a tangible
benefit to the constructive trustee a sine qua non of a constructive
trust., 64
The court in Elliott prefaced its argument on a sentence in the
introduction to the Restatement of Restitution. "The Restatement
of this Subject deals with situations in which a person is accountable
to another on the ground that otherwise he would unjustly benefit
or the other would unjustly suffer loss."66 The court failed to cite
any part of section 160 of the Restatement, the section dealing with
constructive trusts. That section explicitly states that "a constructive
60 E.g., Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423 (1940); Schaefer
v. Bernstein, 180 Cal. App. 2d 107, 4 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1960); Sampson v. Bruder,
47 Cal. App. 2d 431, 118 P.2d 28 (1941); Reay v. Reay, 97 Cal. App. 264, 275
P. 533 (1929).
61 E.g., MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 170 P. 616 (1917); Donnelly
v. Rees, 141 Cal. 56, 74 P. 433 (1903); Heyenfeldt v. Jacobs, 107 Cal. 373, 40 P.
492 (1895); Rankin v. Satir, 75 Cal. App. 2d 681, 171 P.2d 78 (1946).
62 Bank of Am. v. Ryan, 207 Cal. App. 2d 698, 24 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962).
63 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1964).
64 Id. at 210, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
65 Id. at 210, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
66 RESTATEMENT OF REsTiTuTIoN 1 (1937).
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trust is imposed upon a person to prevent his unjust enrichment. 6 7
Professor Scott, the reporter for the topic on constructive trusts, has
said:
The conception of the Restatement is that a constructive trust is a
remedy created to enforce a right of restitution arising out of unjust
enrichment, and that it arises in every case where a benefit consisting
of property has been received as to which there is a duty to make
restitution to another.68
Furthermore, every illustration under section 160 clearly indicates
that a constructive trust is to be used only in a situation where there
is a gain by the defendant; no situation is referred to where there
is merely a loss to the plaintiff. In the first topic which deals with
quasi-contracts, however, there are examples and sections dealing
with a few limited situations where there is a loss to the plaintiff
with no corresponding gain by the defendant.6 9 It would seem that
the introductory statement of the Restatement relied upon by the
court refers to these limited quasi-contractual situations.
The court was bothered by Civil Code sections 2223 and 2224. It
assumed that those sections require that the wrongdoer gain a bene-
fit, and hence it sought to avoid them. The court used an introduc-
tory note of the Restatement in an attempt to neutralize sections 2223
and 2224:
The rules stated in the Restatement of this Subject depend for their
validity upon certain assumptions in regard to what is required by
justice in the various situations. In this Topic these are stated in the
form of principles. They cannot be stated as rules since they are too
indefinite to be of value in a specific case or, for historical or other
reasons, they are not universally applied. They are distinguished
from rules in that they are intended only as general guides for the
conduct of the courts.
70
This section was applied by the court in the construction, not of the
Restatement, but of California Civil Code sections 2223 and 2224.
Moreover, even if statutes could be so loosely interpreted7 1 the Re-
statement section cited by the court was not even intended to apply
to constructive trusts. That section, in its text, is specifically limited
to "this Topic" and since it is found in the introduction to topic one
which deals with quasi-contracts, it does not refer to topic two, which
includes constructive trusts. This is further illustrated by the fact
that in the introduction to topic two no such qualification is found.
Therefore the court's avoidance of sections 2223 and 2224 of the Civil
Code was entirely unjustifiable.
The court was unable to distinguish, from the situation before it,
the cases of Corey v. Struve72 and Noble v. Noble.7 3  In Corey v.
Struve the tenant's lease required him to use beet tops that re-
67 RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUToN § 160, comment c at 42 (1937).
68 SEAvEy & SCOTT, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 41 (1938).
69 RESTATEM MT OF RESTrrUTiON § 1, comment e, at 15 (1937).
70 RESTATEMENT OF REsTITuTIoN 11 (1937) (emphasis added).
71 Cardozo, in recognizing "judge made law as one of the realities of life,"
admitted that a statute which is consistent with the constitution overrides the
law of judges. B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDICOI.L PROCESS 10, 14 (22d
ed. 1964).
72 170 Cal. 170, 149 P. 48 (1915).
73 198 Cal. 129, 243 P. 439 (1926).
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mained after harvest as fertilizer for the land. Instead, he sold the
beet tops as feed for cattle which were pastured on the land by a
third party. The court held the tenant to be a constructive trustee
for the benefit of the landlord of the money gained as a result of the
sale, even though it was found that the natural fertilizer left by the
cattle was more beneficial to the land than the beet tops would have
been.74 In other words, while it is true there was no loss to the
plaintiff, there was clearly a benefit to the defendant-the money-
which justified the imposition of a constructive trust. Therefore
rather than supporting the argument of Elliott, Corey v. Struve lends
support to the contrary position.
In Noble v. Noble75 a sister had conveyed property to her brother
without consideration, with the oral understanding that he would
manage the property and reconvey at her will. Thereafter, with the
sister's consent, the brother exchanged the property for a house and a
lot. Having allowed the house and lot to deteriorate, the brother,
without the knowledge or consent of his sister, sold the property for
one-half of its original value and deposited the money received in his
own account. The court held that the sister could recover by a con-
structive trust, but only that amount which could be traced to the
brother's bank account, that is, the amount by which he benefited by
the sale.76 The court said that the difference between the sale price
and the value of the original property was a matter of personal lia-
bility and that it could not be recovered in an action to impose a
constructive trust.77 Clearly, the sister was limited to the amount
of the benefit unjustly conferred upon her brother.
In opposition to the court's statement, both Corey v. Struve and
Noble v. Noble are distinguishable from, if not contrary to, Elliott.
Corey and Noble each concerned a situation where the property had
changed form; the problem was one of tracing. Both courts limited
recovery to the benefit unjustly derived by the wrongdoer. While the
court in Elliott was correct in finding that the promissory note would
satisfy any technical requirements for a res, there was nothing to
trace since the res was worthless. California courts have held that
where an instrument is void no interest passes thereby and there can
be no imposition of a constructive trust.78
Finally, the court in Elliott suggested that the result in Ward v.
Taggart79 is comparable to the result it was trying to reach. 0 Ward
v. Taggart is important, not for the reasons suggested by Elliott,
but for the reasoning of the court in imposing punitive damages, be-
cause in so doing the court illuminated the true basis of the con-
structive trust. In Ward, the defendant real estate agent fraudulently
misrepresented to a purchaser the price of a certain piece of real
property as $5,000 per acre, when he knew that the owner was
asking $4,000. The purchaser paid the defendant agent $5,000 per
acre, and the defendant then bought the land for $4,000 per acre
74 170 Cal. at 171, 149 P. at 49.
75 198 Cal. 129, 243 P. 439 (1926).
76 Id. at 136, 243 P. at 442.
77 Id.
78 Loomis v. Loomis, 148 Cal. 149, 82 P. 679 (1905); Mandeville v. Salmon,
33 Cal. 38 (1867).
79 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
80 231 Cal. App. 2d at 211, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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and conveyed it to the purchaser. The court held that even though
the land was worth $5,000 per acre, the defendant took the $1,000
per acre differential as a constructive trustee for the purchaser.
The court said that in such a situation the defendant should be
punished, but that a constructive trust would not serve as a puni-
tive measure. All that a constructive trust would accomplish would
be the forced return by the defendant of what he had wrongfully
obtained;81 hence a wrongdoer would have everything to gain and
nothing to lose. For this reason, in addition to the constructive trust
the court imposed punitive damages.82 Rather than being comparable
with the reasoning in Elliott, Ward v. Taggart, in opposition to that
reasoning, points out that the liability of the defendant as a construc-
tive trustee is limited to the extent of the unjust enrichment-the
proprietary interest-retained by him. By implication, the court in
Ward v. Taggart must be taken to say that if there has been no unjust
enrichment, there can be no constructive trust.
83
Summary
The writers, the Restatement of Restitution, and the California
courts have consistently indicated that the basis of a constructive
trust is the prevention of unjust enrichment. The court in Elliott
said that a constructive trust may also be imposed where a person is
wrongfully deprived of property regardless of any unjust enrich-
ment.8 4 While the result in Elliott was equitable, the court reached
it through the wrong remedy.
A constructive trust is a proprietary remedy 5 which must have
something upon which to act-a benefit unjustly retained by the
wrongdoer. The constructive trust as envisaged by the court in
Elliott is a "hybrid-remedy" which would be both a proprietary and a
personal remedy. The application of such a remedy by the court in
Elliott results in a "hybrid-constructive trust" which would appar-
ently return the unjust enrichment; if none, then the defendant
would be personally liable to the extent of the plaintiff's loss.
Whether such a form of action is desirable is beyond the scope of
this note, but such a remedy does not fall within the confines of a
constructive trust as delineated by California statutory and case law.
Elliott v. Elliott was a situation in which a constructive trust
was particularly inapplicable since the defendant had not been un-
justly enriched. Rather than completely changing the character of
the constructive trust to do justice in one case, the court should have
recognized that the plaintiff's recovery should have been limited to
any damages recoverable in an action at law.
Larry Hultquist*
81 51 Cal. 2d at 743, 336 P.2d at 538.
82 Id. at 743, 336 P.2d at 539.
83 The court also reversed the judgment against the escrow agent because
she did not share in the illicit profit. "One cannot be held to be a construc-
tive trustee of something he has not acquired." Id. at 744, 336 P.2d at 538.
84 231 Cal. App. 2d at 210, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
85 Some courts have compared constructive trusts with specific perform-
ance. Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Cal. 2d 485, 496, 150 P.2d 416, 421 (1944) (con-
curring opinion); Henderson v. Fisher, 236 CaL App. 2d 468, 472, 46 Cal. Rptr.
173, 177 (1965).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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